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ABSTRACT As the usage of the web increases, so do the threats an everyday user faces. One of the most pervasive 
threats a web user faces is tracking, which enables an entity to gain unauthorised access to the user’s personal data. 
Through the years many client storage technologies, such as cookies, have been used for this purpose and have been 
extensively studied in the literature. The focus of this work is on three newer client storage mechanisms, namely Web 
Storage, Web SQL Database and Indexed Database API. Initially, a large-scale analysis of their usage on the web is 
conducted to appraise their usage in the wild. Then, this work examines the extent they are used for tracking purposes. The 
results suggest that Web Storage is the most used among the three technologies. More importantly, to the best of our 
knowledge this work is the first to suggest web tracking as the main use case of these technologies. Motivated by these 
results, this work examines whether popular desktop and mobile browsers protect their users from tracking mechanisms 
that use Web Storage, Web SQL Database and Indexed Database. Our results uncover many cases where the relevant 
security controls are ineffective, thus making it virtually impossible for certain users to avoid tracking. 
INDEX TERMS web tracking, web security, privacy, indexed database, indexedDB, web storage, web 
SQL database
I. INTRODUCTION 
As of April 2018, the digital population has reached 4087 
million users [1]. Most users access the web on a daily basis 
for the most diverse array of tasks, from sending emails and 
reading the news to browsing social media and accessing any 
kind of content. The usage of the Internet has improved the 
quality of our lives and provided us with opportunities and 
information, which were previously accessible only to a 
small percentage of people. 
Nonetheless, such advantages do not come without a price. 
While users navigate the web, they expose themselves and 
share, willingly or not, personal information. Indeed, users 
are exposed to different threats, such as tracking and 
behavioural profiling, which directly violate their privacy. 
Many websites deploy a variety of technologies to track the 
users or profile them. These practices are used for a number 
of reasons [2]. For instance, identifying the user and knowing 
their characteristics enables a website to provide a more 
personalized user experience. While this may sound innocent 
and even desirable, the same techniques can be used to 
profile a possible target of a social engineering attack, gather 
personal information to either sell it, use it for advertising or 
for any other kind of surveillance [3]. Many client storage 
technologies have been used for tracking purposes over the 
years; the most famous of all is HTTP cookies. 
Almost a decade ago, the web community was galvanised 
by the advent of HTML5 and the myriad of new primitive 
APIs associated to it. Among them, client-side storage APIs, 
such as Web Storage, Web SQL Database and Indexed 
Database API, were bound to revolutionise the web and 
eventually narrow the differences between web applications 
and native apps. Since then, the web has certainty evolved, 
but web applications are far from replacing native mobile 
apps. Moreover, in some instances, trackers have adopted 
client-side storage techniques as a way to enhance the 
capabilities of HTTP cookies, as shown by [35], but until 
now their use has been considered very limited. 
In this context, this work focuses on Web Storage, Web 
SQL Database and Indexed Database API and investigates 
the usage of these client-side storage APIs as a tracking 
vector. Contrary to previous results in the literature, our 
results suggest that tracking is a major use case for these 
APIs. Moreover, we investigate the user control over the data 
that the aforementioned client-side technologies store on the 
user’s device. Our results uncover multiple cases where the 
users are exposed to privacy violations, as: a) they are unable 
to delete data created by the API of Web Storage, Web SQL 
Database or Indexed Database API even though they are 
attempting to clear locally stored data of their browsing, and 
b) they unknowingly store potentially tracking data created 
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by these APIs while browsing the web in a private session. 
These findings have serious privacy implications, as they 
highlight that it is virtually impossible for certain users to 
avoid web tracking. 
 Our contributions include: 
 We perform a large-scale analysis of the usage of Web 
Storage, Web SQL Database or Indexed Database APIs 
on the web. We quantify their pervasiveness in the 
context of tracking code and find that these technologies 
are mostly used by trackers. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to uncover that the main use 
case of these technologies is web tracking. 
 We investigate the capability of modern, popular 
browsers for desktops and mobile devices to delete data 
that can be stored locally via these APIs. Moreover, we 
examine if data from these APIs remain after a private 
browsing session. In both cases, we find instances where 
the users would be exposed to privacy violations if a 
tracker uses Web Storage, Web SQL Database or 
Indexed Database APIs as the tracking vector, as we 
identified many cases that the relevant security control 
has questionable effectiveness. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
briefly provides the required background in client storage 
technologies. Section III investigates how frequently and for 
which purpose these APIs are used in the wild. Section IV 
reviews the controls offered to the users over these APIs. 
Finally, Section V presents the related work and Section VI 
concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since the early days of the Web, HTTP cookies have been 
used as a client-side storage mechanism. As the web evolved, 
a desire for different and more capacious ways to store 
structured data on the web client started to emerge. Over the 
years, several client-based storage technologies appeared. 
Most of them, such as Local Shared object of Adobe Flash 
[10], Oracle Java [11], Microsoft Silverlight [12] and Google 
Gears (Google Code, 2008), were made available through 
third-party plug-ins. However, with the advent of HTML5, 
browsers started to support native functionalities that could 
replace these third-party plug-ins. Client-side persistent data 
storage technologies were introduced, such as Web Storage 
[13], Web SQL Database [15] and Indexed Database API 
[20]. This section briefly introduces the aforementioned three 
technologies, as well as cookies. 
A.  COOKIES 
An HTTP cookie is a short piece of data (typically with 
size 4K) that a website sends to a client, either via HTTP 
response headers or by using client-side scripting. The client 
is expected to save this data and send it back to the server in 
subsequent HTTP requests. Each cookie is associated to an 
origin, i.e., a combination of the hostname, the port number 
and the protocol used by the web application [5]. This is 
based on a concept known as ‘same-origin policy’, which has 
been the cornerstone of browser security since the early days 
of the web [6]. 
For performance reasons, web browsers limit not only the 
length of HTTP cookies, but also apply constraints to their 
quantity, allowing only a few dozens per origin. Several 
online studies provide an overall view of the limits that 
different web browser vendors set to HTTP cookies [8], [9]. 
Since a webpage can contain resources from multiple 
origins, HTTP cookies are often used to identify and track 
users, not only across different browsing sessions, but also 
across different websites. Over the years, both Internet users 
and legislators have become more aware of the privacy 
implications of third-party tracking [7]. 
B. WEB STORAGE 
Web Storage [13] is a specification that allows web 
applications to create a persistent key-value store in the 
browser, the content of which is maintained either until the 
end of a session (i.e., sessionStorage), or beyond (i.e., 
localStorage). This technology enables web applications to 
store a much greater amount of data compared to HTTP 
cookies. Specifically, the storage capacity provided by web 
storage varies from 5MB to 25MB, depending on the 
browser. An innovative feature of Web Storage is that a web 
application can use a client-side JavaScript API to retrieve 
locally stored data, even when the browser is offline. Web 
Storage is in fact completely based on client-side scripting 
and, unlike HTTP cookies, data cannot be sent via HTTP 
headers. 
Similarly to HTTP cookies, the security model of Web 
Storage is based the same-origin policy. This means that each 
origin has a unique storage object assigned to it. For this 
reason, the specification does not recommended using this 
technology on websites that use a shared host name or do not 
use HTTPS. Otherwise, information leakage or spoofing may 
happen, as for example in the case of DNS spoofing attacks. 
Moreover, the specification recommends treating persistently 
stored data as potentially sensitive, as they could contain 
email addresses or calendar appointments, etc. 
 As with HTTP cookies, a third-party tracking agent could 
use Web Storage to profile users across multiple sessions 
[13]. The specification recommends browser vendors to treat 
web storage content in the same manner as they treat HTTP 
cookies. In particular, vendors are encouraged to organise the 
user interfaces for clearing data in a way that allows users to 
clear all different types of persistent data simultaneously. It is 
also important to point out that, while Web Storage is a much 
lesser known technology than HTTP cookies, its usage is not 
exempt from regulations around personal user data [14]. 
C.  WEB SQL DATABASE 
Web SQL Database [15] is a deprecated specification, 
which allows web applications to store large amounts of data 
in the browser, using client-side transactional databases that 
can be queried using SQL. The specification is based on 
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SQLite, an embedded relational database management 
system developed by D. Richard Hipp [17]. Since the 
beginning of 2010, a few browser vendors started 
implementing experimental versions of the Web SQL 
database API [18]. This was not a complete novelty for some 
of them; Web SQL Database stores data in a very similar 
way to Google Gears and both technologies are based on 
SQLite. Other browser vendors like Mozilla [19], instead, 
decided to avoid Web SQL database completely. In 
November 2010, the W3C announced the decision to 
abandon the Web SQL Database draft lamenting the lack of 
multiple independent implementations. Web SQL Database 
was deprecated in favour of Indexed Database API. Despite 
the deprecation by the W3C, three major browser vendors 
(Chrome, Safari and Opera) have continued supporting Web 
SQL Database and have not yet announced any plan of 
discontinuing it. 
D.  INDEXED DATABASE API (INDEXED DB) 
The first draft of this specification was initially published 
as WebSimpleDB API and it was renamed to Indexed 
Database API the following year [16]. It defines a JavaScript-
based interface for an embedded transactional database 
system. Similarly to Web Storage and Web SQL Database, 
IndexedDB allows storing structured data in the browser and 
the API provided is the only interface a web application 
needs to access and manipulate them. The main difference 
with Web Storage is in the scale and structure of the data that 
can be stored. In fact, Web Storage provides a basic key-
value store that can be useful when dealing with simple 
datasets. On the other hand, Indexed Database API enables 
the storage of larger amounts of structured data and provides 
advanced features, such as in-order key retrieval and storage 
of duplicate values for a key. Fig. 1 includes a snapshot from 
the console of Chrome that shows the client-side storage 
mechanisms, namely Web storage, IndexedDB, Web SQL 
and cookies, which are used by a Twitter Web application. It 
can be noted that IndexedDB can store data in a much more 
structured way compared to cookies and Web Storage, 
having several databases associated to the same origin. Each 
database has one or more object stores and their content can 
be sorted through one or multiple keys. Unlike Web SQL 
Database, IndexedDB is an object-oriented database. The 
interface for adding and retrieving data does not use SQL 
queries, but keys and indexes instead. The security 
recommendations for the usage of Indexed Database API are 
not different to those for Web Storage. The security model of 
IndexedDB still gravitates around the principles of the same-
origin policy. A web application is allowed to access locally 
stored data as long as the request’s origin matches the local 
database’s origin. Unlike HTTP cookies, a maximum storage 
duration does not have to be specified. 
III. EXPLORING THE USAGE OF CLIENT-SIDE 
STORAGE IN THE WILD 
This section discusses the methodology for investigating 
the usage of Web Storage, Indexed Database API and Web 
SQL Database as a tracking mechanism in the wild. In doing 
so, we first investigate the frequency of the usage of these 
technologies on a large-scale sample of the World Wide 
Web. Then, we quantify their pervasiveness in the context of 
third-party tracking code. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
In this subsection, we perform an analysis of a large-scale 
dataset, which contains snapshots of client-side scripts used 
by websites. The aim of our analysis is to demystify the 
pervasiveness of Web Storage, Indexed Database API and 
Web SQL Database in the web and study their use as a 
tracking vector. To this end, we perform static analysis on the 
dataset to identify instances of client-side scripts that make 
use of any of the three APIs by searching for code constructs 
that read and write data in the client. We then identify which 
of the abovementioned scripts belong to well-known tracking 
domains. Fig. 2 shows a high-level diagram of our test 
environment. 
The dataset in use comes from the HTTP Archive project 
created by [21]. Every fortnight, it crawls a list of webpages, 
FIGURE 1.  Representation of client-side stored data provided 
by the console of Chrome.  
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which is loosely based on the Alexa Top Sites [22]. HTTP 
Archive collects data, such as the payload content and logs 
the interaction between the browser and the crawler. It also 
captures the body of the responses for each subresource (i.e. 
any file that is fetched by an HTML page such as scripts, 
stylesheets) used by the website. Since the size of the dataset 
generated by HTTP Archive can be up to several hundreds of 
gigabytes, Google BigQuery [23] was used for its processing. 
For each of the three client-storage APIs one matching rule 
was used to create a series of SQL queries, which run against 
the HTTP Archive dataset using Google BigQuery. These 
rules, which are summarised in Table I, were defined by 
using constructs required to perform basic operations, such as 
creating a data store, reading and writing data. Appendix A 
lays out the constructs that have been identified in this work 
in our matching rules. 
In order to identify whether a subresource belongs to a 
tracker, we created a database of tracking domains by 
aggregating three well-known tracking blacklists, namely: 
Disconnect (2017), No Track [26] and Easy List (2017). To 
this aim, we have developed scripts that combine the 
domains that are listed in the aforementioned blacklists after 
their files have been properly parsed and sanitised. 
We run our experiments against: a) the whole dataset 
provided by HTTP Archive on the 15th of May 2018 and b) 
the Alexa top 10,000 sites. Table II summarises the number 
of websites, subresources and truncated or empty 
subresources in our experiments. We highlight the low 
percentage of truncated or blank subresources, since on those 
the matching rules are not applicable. 
 
 
TABLE I 
MATCHING RULES USED FOR EACH OF API ANALYSED 
Primitive Matching rule 
Web Storage “localStorage” AND (“setItem” OR “getItem”) 
IndexedDB  “indexedDB” AND “transaction” AND “objectStore” 
Web SQL “openDatabase” AND “transaction” AND “executeSql” 
 
TABLE II 
DATA USED FROM HTTP ARCHIVE 
 
Whole Dataset 
(May 2018) 
Data matching 
Alexa’s 10K sites 
Number of websites in the 
dataset 
460099 9020 
Total number of 
subresources in the dataset 
18860393 505745 
Truncated or empty 
subresources (%) 
3.15 5.26 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Table III shows the usage of the primitives considered, on 
the whole dataset provided by HTTP Archive for the 15th of 
May 2018. An interesting result is that more than two thirds 
of the websites analysed contain Web Storage related 
constructs. Another result worth noticing is that the 
constructs analysed are very often found on third party 
subresources. Similarly, Table IV, shows the results for the 
Alexa’s top 10,000 sites. It is interesting to notice that in this 
case, the values for the usage of the Indexed Database API 
are almost double compared to the whole dataset. The use of 
Web SQL remains low in our experiments, which is expected 
as this API is deprecated. 
Table V summarises the number of domains that include at 
least one tracking subresource, which is using one of the 
three client-side storage APIs. As it can be seen, there is a  
FIGURE 2. Architecture of the test environment 
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TABLE III 
RESULTS FOR THE WHOLE DATASET 
Client-side storage API  
Websites with 
construct in 
subresource (%) 
Websites with 
construct in 3rd 
party 
subresource 
(%) 
 
Web Storage  71.66 65.39  
IndexedDB  5.56 5.15  
Web SQL DB 1.34 1.18  
 
TABLE IV 
RESULTS FOR THE ALEXA TOP 10K 
Client-side storage API  
Websites with 
construct in 
subresource (%) 
Websites with 
construct in 3rd 
party 
subresource 
(%) 
 
Web Storage  83.09 77.08  
IndexedDB  11.39 9.89  
Web SQL DB 2.12 1.61  
 
TABLE V 
WEBSITES AND TRACKING SUBRESOURCES 
API / Websites with at least 
one tracking subresource 
using API (%) 
Whole Dataset 
(May 2018) 
Data matching 
Alexa’s 10K sites 
Web Storage  57.72 67.21 
IndexedDB  1.68 3.99 
Web SQL DB 0.76 0.88 
 
TABLE VI 
TRACKING SUBRESOURCES AND PRIMITIVES 
API/ Subresources using the 
API that are flagged as 
‘tracker’ (%) 
Whole Dataset 
(May 2018) 
Data matching 
Alexa’s 10K sites 
Web Storage  71.18 63.88 
IndexedDB  31.87 36.14 
Web SQL DB 53.59 39.90 
 
high percentage of websites containing at least one tracking 
subresource where constructs that belong to Web Storage 
(localStorage) can be found. The figures are much smaller 
for Indexed Database API and considerably smaller for Web 
SQL Database. 
Finally, Table VI highlights the usage of the client-side 
storage techniques in the context of tracking from a different 
angle. It shows amongst all the subresources that have been 
analysed, the percentage of them containing the constructs 
for the API considered that are used by a tracking domain. In 
other words, this table answers the question: “how frequently 
are those storage techniques used as tracking vectors?”. In all 
cases, the frequencies are surprisingly high, starting from 
around 30% for Indexed Database API to more than 70% for 
Web Storage (localStorage). This significant finding suggests 
that currently user tracking is a major use case for the APIs 
that have been examined. Surprisingly, this is also the case 
for a deprecated standard, i.e., Web SQL DB. 
 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
This section has shown that a significant number of the 
websites analysed contains at least one tracking subresource 
having code constructs that belong to at least one of the three 
APIs considered. More importantly, it has shown that 
tracking scripts seem to currently be the major use case of the 
three storage APIs considered. Indeed, in many cases, 
subresources that contain the analysed APIs are often 
identified as trackers. As our experiments used a dataset that 
represents a significant portion of the World Wide Web, we 
consider that our results shed some light on the usage of Web 
Storage, IndexedDB and Web SQL in user tracking.  
However, the usage of HTTP Archive as the dataset for 
our experiments introduces a number of limitations to our 
work. HTTP Archive can only provide snapshots of front 
pages of openly available websites. The scanning engine 
does not perform operations such as user log in or following 
links on a menu. Considering that primitives such as the 
Indexed Database API are designed to support advanced web 
applications, it is reasonable to assume that there are cases of 
websites in which those storage techniques are used only 
once the user is logged in. However, this is an accepted 
limitation, especially considering that in order to quantify the 
usage of client-side storage techniques in the context of user 
tracking, it is far more important to focus on the large-scale 
adoption of the technologies in question rather than on 
specific use cases. 
Another limitation of our work stems from the scanning 
engine of HTTP Archive, as it truncates payloads that are 
greater than 2 MBs. This means that if the constructs defined 
in the matching rules happen to be in the part of the payload 
that HTTP Archive could not capture, they will not be found 
by our queries. However, as shown in Table II truncation and 
empty subresources seldom appear in our dataset. Moreover, 
their absence does not invalidate our findings. On the 
contrary, their successful capture from HTTP Archive might 
provide additional subresources that match our rules, thus 
reinforcing our results. 
In addition, HTTP Archive does not contain snapshots from 
each one of the Alexa Top one million sites. The set of 
websites scanned is loosely based on the Alexa list, but any 
private individual could send a request to HTTP Archive to 
add or remove sites to the dataset. The actual number of 
websites included in each scan is specified in the results 
section. 
Finally, this work suffers from a limitation that is common 
in any static analysis approach. Our work verifies the 
presence of certain constructs in client-side scripts, but 
cannot verify the actual usage of the primitives unless the 
actual web application is executed in the browser, which falls 
outside the scope of our work. For example, a website could 
include a JavaScript library that relies on Web Storage, but 
never execute its code in the browser. Moreover, some 
websites include third-party libraries that perform a set of 
basic operations using a given primitive with the sole 
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purpose of assessing browser capabilities. This practice is 
known as ‘feature detection’ and one of the most well-known 
libraries used for this purpose is Modernizr [27].  
IV. USER CONTROL OVER LOCALLY STORED DATA 
The previous section uncovers that currently Web Storage, 
Indexed Database API and Web SQL Database are 
frequently used as a tracking vector. In this context, this 
section examines: i) whether popular desktop and 
smartphone browsers support the three aforementioned APIs, 
ii) the effectiveness of the deletion of the data stored by them 
as part of the mechanism that clears browsing data, and iii) if 
data remain when they are created in private browsing mode.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned previously in section II.B, the specifications 
recommend browser vendors to treat the data removal of 
various client-side persistent data features in the same way as 
HTTP cookies. This means that browsers are expected to 
make it easy for users, or at least possible, to remove all 
locally stored user data. In addition, nowadays all browsers 
offer to their users the functionality to browse the web 
through a private session (often referred to as private or 
incognito mode). The primary aim of the private session is to 
allow users to browse the web without the browser saving 
data regarding the ‘private’ browsing history. 
We built a simple web application, called Storage Watcher1, 
in order to verify the: a) level of API support in a given 
browser, and b) effectiveness of data deletion. 
The tests were performed in June 2018, on a broad 
selection of desktop (Windows, Mac OS) and smartphone 
(Android, iOS, Windows Phone) browsers. These include the 
most popular browsers in these platforms, such as Firefox, 
Chrome, Safari, Opera, and Edge/Internet Explorer. Tables 
XI and XII in Appendix B include the details of the browsers 
that were analysed and the results of the abovementioned 
experiments. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our results uncover inconsistencies with regards to the 
support of the client-side storage APIs by the different 
browsers (see Tables XI and XII in Appendix B). For 
example, amongst the desktop browsers, Firefox and Edge, 
disable the IndexedDB API when used in private browsing 
mode. In both cases, the other two storage APIs remain 
available. In contrast, certain versions of iOS WebKit-based 
browsers (Safari, Chrome and Firefox for iOS) and Firefox 
for Android, seem to do the exact opposite, as they disable 
the Web Storage and Web SQL Database APIs when in 
private mode, but not the IndexedDB API. It is, however, 
worth mentioning that more recent versions of iOS-WebKit-
based browsers have introduced a more consistent approach 
                                                 
1 Available at: https://github.com/stefano-belloro/storage-watcher 
on which all the three APIs are disabled on private browsing 
mode. 
TABLE VII  
RESULTS FOR USER CONTROL OVER LOCAL STORED DATA 
Issue OS Browser APIs 
Data persists after 
clearing local data 
iOS 10.2.1 Safari, Chrome 
62.0 
IndexedDB 
Android 6 Firefox 57, 
Firefox 60 
IndexedDB 
MiuiBrowser 
9.1.3 
LocalStorage, 
IndexedDB 
Android 7 Firefox 54, 
Firefox 57 
IndexedDB 
Android 8 Firefox 60 IndexedDB 
Data deletion 
requires extra step 
in the UI 
Windows Phone 
8.10 by HTC 
Internet 
Explorer 
IndexedDB 
Mac OS 10.12.5 Firefox 57.0 
(quantum), 
Firefox 56.0 
IndexedDB 
Windows 10 Firefox 56 IndexedDB 
Windows XP Firefox 47 LocalStorage, 
IndexedDB 
Firefox 56, 57 IndexedDB 
Data persists after 
closing private 
session 
iOS 11.1.2 Opera 16 LocalStorage 
Android 6 Opera 43.0 IndexedDB, Web 
SQL 
MiuiBrowser 
9.1.3 
LocalStorage, 
IndexedDB 
Android 7 Opera 42.7, 
Opera 43.0 
IndexedDB, Web 
SQL 
Android 8 Opera 46.3 IndexedDB, Web 
SQL 
Values from non-
private session are 
leaked 
Android 6 MiuiBrowser 
9.1.3 
IndexedDB 
Data stored in 
guest mode is 
deleted only after 
quitting the 
browser 
Mac OS 10.10.5, 
Windows 10 
Chrome 62 localStorage, 
IndexedDB, Web 
SQL 
Our results also uncover multiple cases in which current 
popular browsers cannot protect the privacy of their users, as 
they fail to delete or isolate data stored via the API of Web 
Storage, Web SQL DB or IndexedDB. As summarised in 
Table VII our results suggest that: a) the process of removing 
private data from a browser does not always delete data 
stored in all of the three client-side storage APIs or requires 
an extra step in the browser’s user interface and b) some 
browsers do not fully isolate client-side stored data when 
used in private mode. 
Specifically, certain versions of iOS-WebKit-based 
browsers (Safari2 and Chrome for iOS3) and some Android 
                                                 
2 Reported: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188164 
3Reported 
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=868857 
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browsers (Firefox for Android4 and MiuiBrowser) retain 
IndexedDB API content even after a user requests data 
deletion. In all the cases considered, the user interface not 
only does not make clear that IndexedDB API content will 
persist, but also gives the impression that all ‘offline web site 
data’ will be deleted (Fig. 3). Furthermore, in MiuiBrowser 
v.9.1.3, Web Storage (localStorage) content is also 
maintained, after a user requests the deletion of private data. 
Fortunately, in the case of iOS browsers, this issue seems to 
be resolved in the latest version of the software considered in 
this work. However, this behaviour can still be seen on other 
recent browsers (i.e., Firefox 60 on Android 8). 
It is also worth pointing out that some browsers require the 
user to perform an extra action in order to include 
IndexedDB API content to the process of clearing private 
data. As a matter of fact, on all the desktop versions of 
Firefox5 in scope of this work, whilst the user interface 
allows deleting data stored via IndexedDB API using the 
same panel used to remove HTTP cookies, this option is 
disabled by default. This means that users would have to 
expand the ‘details’ dropdown menu and manually add 
                                                 
4 Reported: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1479403 
5 Reported: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1479414 
‘offline website data’ if they wish to remove IndexedDB API 
content. On an earlier version of Firefox analysed (Firefox 47 
on Windows XP), this was also the case for Web Storage 
(localStorage). This default setting could be misleading for 
an inexperienced user and give a sense of anonymity that 
cannot be guaranteed, especially considering that the 
IndexedDB API could be used as a backdoor to reinstate 
content of HTTP cookies [35]. 
Similarly, Internet Explorer for Windows Phone 8.10 by 
HTC requires a separate action to remove IndexedDB API 
content. In this case, the user needs to navigate to a different 
menu item called "advanced settings" and choose the option 
"manage storage". 
Furthermore, Opera 43 on Android allows the persistence 
of data stored using IndexedDB API and Web SQL Database 
across different private browsing sessions6. Similarly, Opera 
for iOS exhibits the same behavior for Web Storage 
(localStorage) and MiuiBrowser 9.1.3 for both Web Storage 
(localStorage) and IndexedDB API. 
Moreover, in Google Chrome’s guest mode, content stored 
in each of the three APIs persists across different windows 
opened in guest mode7. This means that a user would need to 
quit Chrome completely in order to discard locally stored 
data accumulated in a guest browsing session. This behaviour 
might be misleading for certain users who might assume that 
simply closing the browsing window but not the application 
might be enough to remove locally-stored private data.  
Lastly, when running the experiment on MiuiBrowser 
9.1.3, it was noticed that the browser carries over the values 
of IndexedDB API content created while using the 
application on normal browsing mode. As a result, if a 
private browsing session is preceded by a regular usage of 
the browser in its normal mode, MiuiBrowser allows a third 
party tracker to resume and recreate tracking values set while 
the user was browsing on previous non-private sessions and 
identify them even if they are browsing in private mode. 
C. DISCUSSION 
Our findings suggest that in many cases web users are 
exposed to privacy violations if the website they visit or any 
of its 3rd party subresources use Web storage, IndexedDB 
and Web SQL DB as a tracking vector. This holds true as our 
experiments uncovered instances in which: a) data persists 
after clearing local data or after closing a private session, b) 
data persists unless the user configures the browser 
appropriately, c) persistent data from a non-private session 
are leaked to the private session, and d) data stored in guest 
mode is deleted only after quitting Chrome. It is worth 
stressing, that non security and technically savvy users are 
more likely to use the default settings of the data clearing, 
                                                 
6 Reported: Bug reference: DNAWIZ-38391 
7Reported: 
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=868870 
FIGURE 3. Firefox 57 on Android 6.0. The user interface 
suggest that offline data will be removed. 
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thus failing to delete data that potentially violate their privacy 
in the cases that are describe in Table VII. 
Our work also uncovers inconsistencies with regards to 
disabling certain client-storage APIs in private mode. If the 
reasoning for disabling the APIs is to prevent user tracking, it 
should be noted that advanced tracking mechanisms employ 
multi-tier approaches based on a combination of various 
storage vectors [35]. Therefore, blocking certain APIs whilst 
allowing the usage of others might not produce the desired 
level of privacy. Another interesting aspect is the way that 
browsers have implemented the security controls that handle 
the data of the APIs, namely private browsing and data 
clearing, is inconsistent across different versions of the same 
browsers and across different platforms (c.f. Table XI and 
submitted bugs). 
Moreover, our experiments include a) the most popular 
browsers of the popular operating systems for desktops (i.e., 
Windows, Mac OS) and b) the most popular mobile 
browsers, which can be found in different types of mobile 
devices, such as smartphone and tablets, for the most popular 
platforms (i.e., Android, iOS, Windows Phone). As these 
browsers currently hold the majority of the user share, we 
consider our results representative. Furthermore, as 
summarised in Table VII, it is worth noting that the majority 
of our findings concern popular mobile browsers, such as 
Chrome, Firefox and Safari. Given the popularity of these 
browsers and the fact that mobile devices are nowadays the 
primary vector to access the web [28], this increases the 
impact of our findings. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
A.Client-side storage systems as tracking vectors 
Krishnamurthy and Wills [29] studied the diffusion of 
private user information performed by third-party trackers 
that use a combination of HTTP cookies and other elements 
of the DOM. The authors analysed a selection of 1200 
popular websites and collected statistical data over a period 
of four years. The results showed that the collection of user 
data increased over time, even in websites where the user is 
expected to provide confidential information such as medical 
or financial details. More specifically, during the latest period 
that was analysed, September 2008, the penetration was 70%. 
Furthermore, it was discovered that 52% of the websites 
considered, contained code from at least two third-party 
tracking entities. 
Gonzalez et al. [30] performed a large-scale study on the 
usage, content and format of HTTP cookies in the wild. Their 
work analysed a large dataset of network data that comprised 
of 5.6 billion HTTP requests. The authors determined the 
reach of cookies by measuring the number of referrers that 
generate an HTTP request to the same cookie-setting 
endpoint. They found that, while the vast majority of cookies 
relate to a unique referrer domain, there is a long tail of 
cookies whose originating requests come from a significantly 
high number of different domains. Moreover, the authors 
analysed the names of the cookies and found instances of 
websites that use cookies whose names include a unique 
identifier of the user. Finally, they discovered instances of 
cookies values containing personal identifiable information 
such as users’ IP and email address, which, represent a 
serious breach of privacy.  
Soltani et al. [31] conducted a study on the usage of Flash 
Local Shared Object, often referred to as ‘Flash cookies’, as a 
tracking vector. They analysed the top 100 domains ranked 
by QuantCast. On 31 of them, they found at least a case of 
data overlap between HTTP cookies and Flash cookies, 
meaning that the same value appeared on the data stored in 
both technologies. Moreover, they found several occurrences 
of what they defined as “cookie respawning”, in which the 
value of a deleted HTTP cookie is restored in the 
background, taken from a Flash cookie that keeps its back 
up. On a follow-up study, Ayenson et al. [32] observed the 
emerging usage of Web Storage (localStorage) as a tracking 
vector. While the authors did not find if this storage system 
was directly employed as part of respawning mechanisms, 
they noticed several cases of matching values among HTTP 
cookies and Web Storage data, which they named ‘HTML5 
cookies’. 
Roesner et al. [33] presented an in-depth investigation of 
web tracking performed by third-party actors. The work 
analysed a corpus of around 1000 websites, spanning from 
very popular to lesser-used websites, and found the presence 
of over 500 unique trackers. The authors proposed a 
classification of trackers that goes beyond the usual notion of 
first-party and third-party trackers. Instead, they introduced a 
classification system based on the tracking behaviour that is 
observable from the client. This system challenges the 
significance of classifying cookies as either third-party or 
first-party. In fact, all cookies could be classified as first-
party in the context of their own origins and often users visit 
those origins as ‘first-party clients’, such as in the case of 
social networks. For this reason, the authors suggested the 
usage of terms like “tracker-owned” cookies and “site-
owned” cookies. The work also documented the occurrence 
of “cookie leaks”, in which the contents of a cookie 
associated to a given origin are passed as parameters in a 
request to another origin, with the purpose of circumventing 
the browser’s same-origin policy. Furthermore, the authors 
attempted to quantify the usage of alternatives to HTTP 
cookies. The authors found “remarkably little use” of Web 
Storage (localStorage). In fact, out of the 524 trackers 
identified, this storage mechanism was used in only 8 cases. 
Moreover, only 5 of them were found to contain unique 
identifies. All of those 5 cases were instances of cookie 
respawning, meaning that the user identifiers were copies of 
the values found on HTTP cookies. Finally, Flash LSOs were 
used by 35 trackers, but only 9 of them were identified as 
instances of cookie respawning. 
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Acar et al. [34] performed a large-scale analysis of a 
selection of advanced persistent tracking mechanisms. They 
reported the usage of Indexed Database API as a storage 
mechanism of tracking data, albeit in a small number of cases 
(20 out of the 100 000 analysed - 0.02%). The authors 
claimed to be the first to document evidence of the usage of 
IndexedDB as an evercookie vector. “Evercookie” is a 
technique that significantly increases the resilience of 
tracking HTTP cookies [35]. The mechanism consists of a 
client-side API that replicates the HTTP cookie data across 
several types of client-side storage systems. 
Derksen et al. [36] also discussed the usage of Web 
Storage (localStorage) and Indexed Database API for 
tracking. The authors analysed the behaviour of twenty 
popular tracking services on a selection of about a thousand 
websites. They found that localStorage was used by 15% of 
the trackers analysed. Moreover, none of the websites 
analysed showed the usage of Indexed Database API as a 
tracking vector. The authors also studied the implementation 
of data deletion. They found that the browsers they analysed 
allowed the deletion of both Web Storage (localStorage) and 
IndexedDB data, via the same mechanism that removes 
cookies. Similarly, Bujlow et al. [37], seem to imply that the 
content of data stored using these techniques is automatically 
emptied when the cookies are cleared. However, as this work 
uncovers currently in some popular browsers, data deletion 
requires either an extra step by the user in order to include 
HTML5-related client-side storage techniques or does not 
happen at all. 
Another known practice used by trackers is cookie 
matching (or cookie syncing). This technique is used in real-
time advertising bidding, allowing trackers to associate 
different tracking profiles that relate to the same user. Olejnik 
et al. [38] quantified both the frequency and the breadth of 
data leakage related to cookie matching. They analysed a 
sample of 100 user profiles and found that 91 of them were 
subject to cookie matching, showing instances of trackers 
leaking 27% of a user’s browsing history. Moreover, they 
showed that the market value of parts of a users’ browsing 
history can be as low as a fraction of a US dollar cent. 
Englehardt [39] also discussed cookie-syncing, warning 
that it can allow the sharing of personal data between 
different tracking servers, without the user’s direct consent. 
Cookie syncing can also further enhance the impact of cookie 
respawning. In fact, while most major trackers do not use 
mechanisms such as the aforementioned evercookie, they 
might share user information with trackers that do use 
techniques of cookie resurrection. 
B.Preventive measures against user tracking 
The ‘Do Not Track’ header was proposed by [40] as a 
measure against undesired user tracking. Compliant tracking 
agents are expected to refrain from identifying users and 
perform their usual activities according to the preference 
expressed by the user through the header. This proposal was 
extremely impactful and most major browser implemented 
the Do Not Track (DNT) header by the following year. 
Moreover, in 2015, the W3C started the work of formalising 
this feature into a web standard called Tracking Preference 
Expression (DNT) [41]. 
However, according to Roesner et al. in [31], the ‘Do Not 
Track’ header does not seem to have any visible effect in 
preventing tracking, as it is a policy that relies on the 
goodwill of the tracker. Moreover, it appears that many of the 
parties involved with user tracking argue that their behaviour 
should not be considered tracking as it is defined by the DNT 
specification, and consequentially refuse to implement it. 
Furthermore, the authors pointed out that neither blocking 
third-party cookies is an effective method as some browsers 
only block the writing operation of a cookie, but not the 
reading. Therefore, the tracker would still be able to read the 
value of a cookie that has been set on a previous visit to 
social media sites or by advertising popups. Finally, the 
authors mentioned that private browsing mode is not an 
effective anti-tracking method because it is primarily 
designed to protect users from attackers with physical access 
to the machine and not necessarily from remote user 
tracking. As a method of protecting users’ privacy, the 
authors propose ShareMeNot, a browser extension that limits 
third-party tracking code that belongs to social media sites, 
while making sure that actual functionality visible to the user 
remains unaffected. In practice, the extension allows tracking 
requests to be sent only when the user clicks on an embedded 
social media button (such as Facebook's “Like”). The 
solution proposed by the authors has been subsequently 
incorporated into another privacy tool named “Privacy 
Badger”, a browser extension that uses algorithmic methods 
to decide which resource is tracking the user and verifies 
whether scripts that belong to a given domain collect unique 
identifiers even after sending a “Do Not Track” message. In 
this case, it automatically disallows content from that third-
party tracker [42]. 
In [43] Mayer studied a series of technologies developed to 
protect users from third-party trackers. The author found that 
community-maintained blacklists are the most effective way 
to prevent undesired user tracking. Those lists mainly consist 
of URLs or domains and are generally used in conjunction 
with browser extensions, such as AdBlock Plus [44]. The 
author also claimed that tracking is often inextricably tangled 
with third-party advertising, therefore often blocking trackers 
also entails blocking code that provides advertisements. 
Mylonas et al. [45] analysed the security controls of 
several mobile and desktop browsers. According to their 
results, desktop browsers generally provide better protection, 
as the controls available on them perform better than those 
available on their mobile counterparts. For example, users of 
the mobile browsers do not have the option to opt-out of 
third-party cookies and in many cases the interface that 
allows the user to control security features can be confusing. 
Finally, the authors found a number of security issues on two 
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major mobile browsers and also pointed out that in most of 
the mobile browsers the ‘Do Not Track’ header is 
unavailable. 
Virvilis et al. [46] compared the different protection 
measures against rogue sites offered by desktop and mobile 
browsers. According to their results mobile browsers often 
offer a lower level of protection compared to their desktop-
based counterparts and in some cases they offer no protection 
at all. Furthermore, the authors introduced Secure Proxy, a 
new browser-independent countermeasure that overcomes 
the technical limitations related to each specific browser 
without the need of browser extensions. Secure Proxy 
consists of a HTTP forward proxy that operates at network 
level to filter content before it reaches the user’s device. The 
filtering mechanism is delegated to a third-party service that 
assesses the reliability of the content providers, based on the 
aggregation of multiple blacklists and Antivirus engines. 
Building from the previous work, Nisioti et al. [47] revisit 
the anti-phishing mechanisms available for users of mobile 
browsers of three popular operating systems. The study 
revealed that the protection provided by pre-installed web 
browsers is still very poor and in most cases non-existent. 
The only browsers that offer an adequate level of protection 
are Firefox and Chrome on Android. Moreover, in iOS, 
neither the default browser nor any of the third-party 
browsers offer any protection against phishing attacks. In this 
context, the authors proposed TRAWL (TRAnsparent Web 
protection for alL), an extension of ‘Secure Proxy’. Similarly 
to ‘Secure Proxy’, TRAWL is implemented outside the 
users’ device in order to avoid resource consumption and to 
offer cross platform compatibility. The tool provides DNS 
and URL filtering based on a collection of curated blacklists, 
but instead of delegating the filtering to a third-party service 
it performs it locally. In this way, the user’s privacy is 
preserved and any third party limitations are overcome. 
Similarly, Kontaxis and Chew [48] present a new anti-
tracking mechanism of Mozilla Firefox, called Tracking 
Protection. The mechanism is similar to ad-blocking browser 
extensions such as AdBlock Plus. It analyses all outgoing 
HTTP requests and matches them against a blacklist, which 
is based on a curated list of tracking origins. The authors 
evaluated their approach against 200 popular news sites and 
according to the results there was a 67.5% reduction in the 
number of HTTP cookies. Moreover, this approach resulted 
on a 44% median reduction in page load time and 39% 
reduction in data usage for the testes sites. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Online tracking is an everyday practice and, when it is 
performed against the user’s will it is a major privacy 
violation. While older client-side storage technologies such 
as cookies have been studied extensively as tracking vectors, 
newer technologies, i.e., Web Storage, Indexed Database API 
and Web SQL Database, have not received the same level of 
attention. In this paper, we measure the frequency of use of 
these technologies on a HTTP Archive dataset, which 
constitutes a representative sample of the World Wide Web, 
and examine the extent to which they are used for tracking 
purposes. As shown by the results, currently there is a large 
fraction of websites that utilize the three primitives, with 
Web Storage being the most used. However, the most 
alarming result is the frequency in which these APIs seem to 
used by trackers, which for all three technologies seems to be 
higher than 30% and in particular almost 70% for Web 
Storage. Finally, we examined whether the current popular 
web browsers for desktops and mobile devices can protect 
their users from privacy violations that use the 
aforementioned three technologies as the tracking vector. 
Our results suggest that in many cases the relevant security 
controls (i.e., data clearing and private mode) are ineffective 
in deleting the relevant data and ensuring isolation of the data 
when used in private sessions. The bugs that were identified 
in this work have been reported to the relevant browser 
vendors as indicated in section 4.B. 
APPENDIX A: MATCHING RULES USED IN STATIC 
ANALYSIS 
The Web Storage API provides two storage mechanisms, one 
for handling data within a current session (sessionStorage) 
and another one that lasts beyond the current session 
(localStorage). In this work, only the constructs used by 
localStorage were considered, as content stored using 
sessionStorage expires at the end of a browsing session. 
TABLE VIII shows the constructs needed in order to read or 
write data using localStorage. 
 
TABLE VIII 
CONSTRUCTS USED BY WEB STORAGE (LOCALSTORAGE) 
Web Storage 
constructs 
Usage 
localStorage Property of the ‘window’ object that needs to be used to 
access the Storage assigned to each origin 
setItem Method that adds a new item to the storage magnetic 
induction 
getItem Method that retrieves item to the storage 
 
 The same process was followed for the Indexed Database 
API. The constructs mentioned in TABLE IX are part of the 
steps necessary to create a local database containing an 
object store and to access the store to either read or write 
data. 
TABLE IX 
CONSTRUCTS USED BY INDEXED DATABASE API 
IndexedDB 
API constructs 
Usage 
indexedDB Attribute of the ‘window’ object that provides 
applications a mechanism for accessing IndexedDB (of 
type ‘IDBFactory’) 
transaction Method needed to access the object store 
objectStore Method that returns an object store in the scope of the 
transaction 
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Similarly, TABLE X shows the constructs necessary to 
read and write data using the now deprecated Web SQL 
Database API. 
  
TABLE X 
CONSTRUCTS USED BY WEB SQL DATABASE 
Web SQL 
Database 
constructs 
Usage 
openDatabase Method that opens a Web SQL database, or creates a 
new one if none is found 
transaction Method to access the database 
executeSql Method that defines the SQL command to perform in a 
given transaction 
 
APPENDIX B: FULL RESULTS OF SECTION IV 
Tables XI and XII provide all the results from the experiments that were described, summarised and discussed in Section IV. 
 
TABLE XI 
API SUPPORT AND DATA DELETION RESULTS IN THE EXAMINED MOBILE BROWSERS 
OS Browser Mode API support Data deletion 
localStorage IndexedDB Web 
SQL 
localStorage IndexedDB Web SQL 
iOS 
10.2.1 
Safari 
default supported Supported supported data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
data deleted 
private disabled Supported disabled N/A data deleted N/A 
Chrome 62.0 
default supported Supported supported data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
data deleted 
incognito disabled Supported disabled N/A data deleted N/A 
Firefox 10.2 
default supported Supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private disabled Supported disabled N/A data deleted N/A 
Opera 16 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data deleted data deleted 
Mini not 
supported 
not supported not 
supported 
N/A N/A N/A 
iOS 
11.1.2 
Safari 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private disabled disabled disabled N/A N/A N/A 
Firefox 10.3 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private disabled disabled disabled N/A N/A N/A 
Chrome 62.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private disabled disabled disabled N/A N/A N/A 
Opera 16 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data deleted data deleted 
Mini not 
supported 
not supported not 
supported 
N/A N/A N/A 
Windows 
Phone 
8.10 by 
HTC 
Internet 
Explorer 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted needs extra 
step: "advanced 
settings" > 
"manage 
storage" 
N/A 
Android 
6.0 
Firefox 60.0.1 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
N/A 
private supported not supported not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
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Firefox 57 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
N/A 
private supported not supported not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Firefox Focus 
2.4 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted N/A 
Chrome 66.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Chrome 62.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Opera 46.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Opera 43.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data deleted data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data persists after 
closing private 
session 
Opera Mini 
31.0 
default not 
supported 
not supported not 
supported 
N/A N/A N/A 
Microsoft 
Edge Preview 
1.0.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
inPrivate supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
MiuiBrowser 
9.1.3 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
N/A 
incognito supported carries over 
values from 
non incognito 
version 
not 
supported 
data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data persists 
after closing 
private session 
N/A 
Edge 1.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
inPrivate supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Android 
7.0 
Firefox 57 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
N/A 
Opera 43.0 
private supported supported supported data deleted data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data persists after 
closing private 
session 
Android  
7.1 
Chrome 65.0 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Firefox Focus 
5 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted N/A 
Opera 42.7 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data deleted data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data persists after 
closing private 
session 
Firefox 54.0 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
local data 
N/A 
private supported not supported not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Android 
8.0 
Chrome 
66.0.3 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Firefox Focus 
5 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted N/A 
Opera 46.3 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data deleted data persists 
after closing 
private session 
data persists after 
closing private 
session 
Firefox 60.0.1 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data persists 
after clearing 
N/A 
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local data 
private supported not supported not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
 
 
TABLE XII 
API SUPPORT AND DATA DELETION RESULTS IN THE EXAMINED DESKTOP BROWSERS 
OS Browser Mode API support Data deletion 
localStorage IndexedDB Web 
SQL 
localStorage IndexedDB Web SQL 
Mac OS 
10.12.5 
Firefox 57.0 
(quantum) 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted only 
if 'Offline 
website data' is 
explicitly 
selected by the 
user 
N/A 
private supported disabled not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Firefox 56.0 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted only 
if 'Offline 
website data' is 
explicitly 
selected by the 
user 
N/A 
private supported disabled not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Mac OS 
10.10.5 
Chrome 62 
guest supported supported supported data deleted only 
after quitting 
chrome 
data deleted only 
after quitting 
chrome 
data deleted only 
after quitting chrome 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Opera 49 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Safari 10.1.1 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private disabled supported disabled N/A data deleted N/A 
Windows 
10 
Edge 40 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted N/A 
inPrivate supported disabled not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Chrome 62 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
guest supported supported supported data deleted only 
after quitting 
chrome 
data deleted only 
after quitting 
chrome 
data deleted only 
after quitting chrome 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Firefox 56 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted only 
if 'Offline 
website data' is 
explicitly 
selected by the 
user 
N/A 
private supported disabled not 
supported 
data deleted N/A N/A 
Opera 49 
default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
private supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Windows 
XP 
Internet 
Explorer 11 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted data deleted N/A 
Chrome 62 default supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2869251, IEEE Access
 
VOLUME XX, 2017 9 
incognito supported supported supported data deleted data deleted data deleted 
Firefox 47 
default supported supported not 
supported 
data deleted only 
if 'Offline website 
data' is explicitly 
selected by the 
user 
data deleted only 
if 'Offline 
website data' is 
explicitly 
selected by the 
user 
N/A 
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